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consumo en países en desarrollo
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Abstract
This paper provides a review of the general concepts and inﬂ  uential ﬁ  n-
dings of empirical research on risk-coping behavior and consumption 
smoothing arrangements in rural economies of developing countries. 
Low-income individuals live with high levels of risk and limited ac-
cess to formal ﬁ  nancial systems for credit and insurance. In general, 
the evidence indicates that their informal mechanisms to mitigate 
risk play an important role in partially protecting their consumption. 
However, these alternatives do not allow rural households to achieve 
an optimal allocation of risk across time and income cycles and are 
costly on equity grounds. In addition, risks that remain uninsured seem 38
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to have adverse long term welfare consequences. Public interventions 
can play a signiﬁ  cant role in improving the income security of rural 
households. In doing so, it is crucial to have a good understanding 
of the causes and not simply the symptoms of informal risk-coping 
behavior and its social welfare implications. 
Key words: risk-coping behavior, consumption-smoothing arrange-
ments, income volatility, informal insurance, developing countries.
JEL Classiﬁ  cation: O120, O150, O160, O170.
Resumen
Este trabajo presenta una revisión de conceptos generales y resultados 
empíricos sobre el comportamiento ante el riesgo y los mecanismos 
disponibles para estabilizar el consumo de los hogares rurales en países 
en desarrollo. Individuos de bajos ingresos enfrentan usualmente altos 
niveles de riesgo y tienen un limitado acceso a sistemas ﬁ  nancieros 
formales de crédito y aseguramiento. En general, la evidencia indica 
que sus mecanismos informales para mitigar el riesgo juegan un papel 
importante en proteger su consumo. Sin embargo, estas alternativas no 
permiten que estos hogares alcancen una asignacion óptima de riesgo a 
través del tiempo y ciclos del ingreso y resultan altamente inequitativas. 
Adicionalmente, el riesgo no asegurado parece tener efectos adversos 
de largo plazo en su bienestar. La política pública puede jugar un papel 
importante en mejorar la estabilidad del ingreso de los hogares rurales. 
Para ello, es crucial un buen entendimiento de las de las causas y no 
de los síntomas del comportamiento de aseguramiento informal ante 
el riesgo y de sus implicaciones sobre el bienestar. 
Palabras clave: comportamiento ante el riesgo, mecanismos de estabi-
lización del consumo, volatilidad del ingreso, aseguramiento informal, 
países en desarrollo.
Clasiﬁ  cación JEL: O120, O150, O160, O170.
Introduction
Among many other challenges, individuals in developing countries 
survive with low incomes under high levels of uncertainty. According 58 SEGUNDO SEMESTRE DE 2006, PP . 37-83.
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to the World Bank (2003), approximately 70% of the workers in low-
income countries are employed in agricultural activities and, conse-
quently, are relatively more vulnerable to factors beyond their control 
(e.g. weather, crop prices variation, diseases, pests, etc.). However, 
income ﬂ  uctuations are not expected to alter consumption and well-
being if poor households have the means to protect themselves by 
saving in “good” times and dissaving in “bad” times. 
The absence of formal means to smooth the consumption of low-in-
come households is a central feature of livelihoods in the developing 
world. Many of the non-market risk-coping mechanisms available to 
them are extremely precarious. The lack of assets, underdeveloped 
market opportunities for dealing with risk (credit and insurance), the 
shortage of public transfers during crises, the low levels of education 
and the limited ability to switch jobs, among other problems, limit the 
capacity of poor farmers to reduce the impact of adverse shocks. In 
many cases, the consequences of these downturns may be large enough 
to remain for a long time, lowering consumption below subsistence 
levels and, thereby, affecting nutrition, health, schooling and other 
human and physical vital assets related with future potential earnings. 
A better understanding of how the income of farmers in poor countries 
changes with unfavorable shocks, formal and informal arrangements 
available to deal with risk and the effects of income variability on 
basic dimensions of socioeconomic welfare is crucial for the design 
of development aimed policies. 
This paper is a review of the literature on income volatility and con-
sumption smoothing in rural areas of developing countries. Conside-
ring the popularity of these issues among researchers in development 
economics, particularly in the last 15 or 20 years, this work is not 
intended to be an exhaustive assessment of all relevant studies. The 
cases included here were chosen because they illustrate a particular 
approach to the question posed or have been highly inﬂ  uential. Nearly 
all the conclusions have been drawn from the same Indian data and a 
few other samples collected mainly in Asia and Africa. Latin America, 
a region with a massive proportion of people deriving their incomes 
from agriculture and living in poverty, is clearly underrepresented 
in this survey, in large part due to the lack of suitable information to 
investigate these issues.40
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This review is organized as follows. The next section discusses the 
main generalities that appear to typify the effects of uncertainty on 
consumption smoothing in the context of poor rural areas. Section 
two examines some empirical tests available in the literature to gauge 
whether consumption is protected against income and assets shortfalls. 
Section three reviews relevant evidence to illustrate the most impor-
tant informal risk-mitigating institutions developed in low-income 
countries. Based on some empirical work, section four explores the 
short and long term effects of income ﬂ  uctuations on the well-being 
of poor households. Finally section ﬁ  ve concludes.
I.   Poverty and vulnerability to risk
While it is true that risk and uncertainty are present in high-, middle- 
and low-income countries, it is also true that income volatility is 
more challenging for residents of most low-income countries. In these 
countries, the mechanisms to smooth risk either do not work well or 
do not exist. Low-income individuals in the developing world suffer 
disproportionately from almost all shocks because they are both more 
likely to be exposed to them and less protected from them.
Agriculture’s share of GDP is higher in these countries. About 30% of 
the total output in low-income countries is obtained from agricultural-
related activities, a share that falls to 10% and 2% for middle- and 
high-income economies, respectively (World Bank, 2004). Hence, 
the resources of a vast majority of poor households are generated in 
the form of farming jobs such as cash crops, subsistence cultivation, 
livestock production, ﬁ  shing, forestry, hunting, and also as hired la-
bor. All these sources of employment and income bear numerous and 
often unexpected risks such as weather-related shocks, ﬂ  uctuations in 
international markets and prices, crop diseases, environmental degra-
dation, pollution, population displacement, among others. Hence, the 
returns from agriculture are by nature very unpredictable and entail 
elevated degrees of uncertainty. Consequently, poor individuals live in 
high-risk environments because of their heavy reliance on this sector. 
The implications of this dependence in terms of risk-allocation beha-
vior are non trivial. For instance, Morduch (1990) and Binswagner 
and Rosenzweig (1993) found that the coefﬁ  cient of variation (CV) 
of farm proﬁ  ts in a group of villages in South India is close to 125%. 58 SEGUNDO SEMESTRE DE 2006, PP . 37-83.
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Putting that number in context and assuming a moderate degree of 
risk aversion, they estimated that farmers with just one third of that 
CV would be willing to give up to 16% of their earnings to achieve a 
perfect smoothing, which is a very high-risk premium.
Human diseases are also prevalent in the underdeveloped world. 
Despite huge advances in creating new medicines, technologies and 
treatments worldwide, many poor people in developing countries are 
experiencing unparalleled reversals in human well-being. According 
to the World Health Organization (WHO, 2006), life expectancies 
have fallen in some of the poorest nations to half the level of the 
richest ones. Usually low-income individuals do not have the same 
access to health care, and disease prevention programs are weak in 
these countries, particularly the most rural ones. A rising transmission 
of HIV/AIDS, the latent emergence of other chronic diseases (e.g. 
Ebola, Avian Inﬂ  uenza, Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) and the 
limited availability of effective vaccines and antiviral drugs to prevent 
diseases and cope with pandemics are also very predominant in these 
regions. Consequently, the poor appear to be less equipped to mitigate 
the effects of health-related risks.
Natural disasters are another reason for uncertainty. Their frequency 
and impact in terms of human casualties and economic costs have 
skyrocketed in the last two decades. The level of annual losses from 
these events in constant terms increased from $3.9 billion in the 1950’s 
to $63 billion in the 1990’s (International Red Cross, 2005). These 
events tend to hit poor people the hardest for many reasons. Poor 
people in rural areas often live in very fragile dwellings and occupy 
dangerous locations such as river banks, ﬂ  ood plains, steep slopes and 
wild land with inadequate infrastructure. Their living arrangements are 
often characterized by the lack of appropriate emergency management 
systems to resist natural disasters and bear ﬁ  nancial and human losses. 
Furthermore, most developing countries face huge ﬁ  scal constraints 
to embark on helpful disaster recovery programs.
The fundamental question that arises is how to maintain satisfactory 
levels of consumption in face of volatile incomes. Depending on the 
sector and timing, actions can be taken either to mitigate the effects 
of negative production shocks on income (ex-ante) or to preserve con-42
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sumption for a given income realization (ex-post). Savings, insurance 
contracts, social insurance arrangements or communitarian risk-sharing 
schemes are examples of the ﬁ  rst group of actions, while borrowing, 
trading of assets, private and public transfers and changes in the labor 
supply are examples of the latter.
However, once shocks occur, poor rural households and businesses 
often do not have the means to fully smooth consumption. Their inco-
mes are already low, often do not have enough savings and their asset 
holdings such as tools, seeds and livestock are not only very liquid but 
are also used for production. They are also short of well developed ins-
truments to deal with income shortfalls. On one hand, formal ﬁ  nancial 
systems for credit and insurance are precarious, incomplete or do not 
exist at all. In turn, these capital market constraints reduce the capacity 
of households and farmers to invest in risk-coping technologies. On 
the other hand, informal mechanisms of credit and insurance, although 
partially useful to increase the risk bearing capabilities of villages to 
idiosyncratic shocks, do not allow an efﬁ  cient reallocation of global 
risks. And public interventions like safety nets and emergency relief aid 
aimed to protect poor people from economic crises are quite limited.
Other features of these economies make it more difﬁ  cult to build up 
formal arrangements to deal with uncertainty and moderate the effects 
of turndowns. For instance, institutional weaknesses, instability in 
the legal system, limited existence of intellectual and property rights, 
narrow land titling, lack of developed physical infrastructure and 
low levels of education make contract writing and enforcement very 
complex. Private savings may also be limited by problems such as 
high inﬂ  ation, price variability of basic foodstuffs and high transaction 
costs that make it hard to ﬁ  nd assets that guarantee a positive reward 
for delaying consumption.
II.   Does household consumption track household
 income?
As will become evident below, despite these difﬁ  culties, poor house-
holds in developing countries still have ways to handle risk. By fo-
llowing strategies to smooth either income or consumption –or both, 
households might be able to diversify so that consumption levels 58 SEGUNDO SEMESTRE DE 2006, PP . 37-83.
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remain unaffected. But, with the realization of negative shocks do 
these mechanisms perform similarly to the benchmark set by fully 
functioning markets for credit and insurance? How vulnerable do 
households remain to temporary shocks? Since the theory can predict 
ﬁ  nal allocations consistent with transitory events being either totally or 
just partially smoothed away, this concern becomes mainly a subject 
of empirical matter.
The literature offers some estimates of the extent to which consumption 
is protected against income ﬂ  uctuations. Townsend’s work (1994) 
–one of the most widely cited studies– examines this issue by jointly 
evaluating all the institutions that might insure rural households at 
the community level. Using a pool of cross-sectional data for the 
period 1975-1984 from the International Crops Research Institute of 
the Semi-Arid Tropics (Icrisat) –which provides the information for 
much of the empirical work in this ﬁ  eld, he tested the full risk sharing 
hypothesis in three poor and high risk villages in southern India. More 
speciﬁ  cally, he runs regressions with household consumption as the 
dependent variable on average village consumption, household income 
and other controls. One would expect the coefﬁ  cients on village con-
sumption and transitory income to approach one and zero, respectively, 
as the markets for insurance and credit are more complete. Townsend 
did ﬁ  nd evidence to reject full insurance in the sample, namely that 
income shocks matter in the determination of consumption and are 
statistically different from zero. However, the overall effect of income 
in consumption is surprisingly low, with the highest coefﬁ  cient value 
being 0.14, suggesting the existence of a signiﬁ  cant degree of insurance 
against idiosyncratic shocks at the village level. His results also hint 
at important differences in access to insurance by land ownership. 
Landless and small farmers, also the poorest in the sample, are less 
protected from this type of event.
An alternative test of full insurance incorporates savings as an ex-
planatory variable. Paxson’s study (1992), a paper I will return to 
in more depth in the next section, adopts such a design to examine 
whether farmers in some regions of Thailand used savings to smooth 
consumption. Her ﬁ  ndings indicate that these households were able to 
save and dissave to stabilize consumption in response to unpredictable 
changes in income. Nevertheless, although her estimates of the mar-44
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ginal propensities to save out of transitory shocks to income are very 
high (ranging from 0.73 to 0.83) and suggest an important amount of 
consumption smoothing, they are not supportive of full insurance. And 
more importantly, since the author uses rainfall data to approximate 
transitory income, one should be cautious about generalizing these 
conclusions to other types of temporary shocks.
More recently, Morduch (2002) used panel data from Icrisat and im-
plemented other tests to illustrate if formal and informal mechanisms 
together can reduce total income risk. His estimates of the coefﬁ  cients 
on income growth are somewhere between 0.19 and 0.32, far from the 
value of 1.0 but yet a sign that complete insurance does not hold. Fur-
thermore, he argues that for many subgroups, particularly lower status 
castes and poor households, those mechanisms work badly and do not 
stand as close substitutes of perfect insurance and credit systems. In an 
earlier paper, Morduch (1991) also found evidence consistent with the 
latter claim, in the sense that food consumption growth appeared to be 
substantially less uninsured among small-scale farmers and landless 
workers in rural India.
Despite limitations in database availability at the micro level, there 
are a few pieces of evidence for Latin America as well. Using two 
rounds of Mexican rural household surveys from Progresa (a poverty 
reduction program, now called Oportunidades, that started in 1997 
and combines education, health and nutrition interventions), García-
Verdú (2001) examined consumption responses to individual shocks. 
He found a considerable amount of risk-sharing pool among village 
members. But his results also indicate that household consumption and 
income seemed to be highly related in these villages, where changes 
in the latter account for nearly 47% of ﬂ  uctuations in consumption. 
Likewise, Barrera and Perez (2005) investigated a household’s ability 
to smooth consumption in the presence of idiosyncratic shocks using 
longitudinal data from Colombia and Nicaragua. Similar to the results 
mentioned above, they provide evidence that households were able to 
insure consumption, but this insurance was imperfect.
The work to date on the extent of consumption smoothing in rural areas 
is not completely decisive and does not allow one to draw deﬁ  nitive 
conclusions. However, even though just a small sample of the studies 58 SEGUNDO SEMESTRE DE 2006, PP . 37-83.
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has been cited here, some general patterns emerge from an extensive 
review of the available evidence. At least three lessons are worth 
mentioning. First, most if not all of the empirical work has mainly 
rejected the full-risk sharing model. Second, and regardless of that 
rejection, a large amount of consumption smoothing is taking place. 
Rural households are not purely consuming what they earn, although 
the poorest have less scope to do so. And third, considering some mar-
ket failures (e.g. limited enforcement, costly monitoring, market size) 
that hinder formal insurance and credit institutions are more frequent 
in rural villages, informal mechanisms seem to play a signiﬁ  cant role 
in protecting their consumption. Therefore, a good understanding of 
which and how these alternative mechanisms provide effective in-
surance and credit is crucial for policy design. Bearing that in mind, 
the next section is intended to present a review on several aspects of 
informal behavioral and institutional responses to risk. 
III.  Risk-coping mechanisms in low-income economies
In spite of the various obstacles that people may face in low-income 
settings, they often access alternative systems (usually called “infor-
mal’) to mitigate risk. Indeed, as the literature shows, these households 
do insure consumption against income instability to some extent. Ro-
senszweig and Wolpin (1993) conducted simulations in Icrisat villages 
in rural India that are useful to motivate the discussion in regard to 
these informal mechanisms. They modeled and evaluated a system 
with complete insurance that was to be fully funded by farmers. They 
found that this type of intervention neither increased farmer’s proﬁ  ts 
nor enhanced their welfare. A possible interpretation is that the frequent 
refusal of farmers to accept non-subsidized weather insurance is not 
evidence of risk neutrality but rather of signiﬁ  cant access to informal 
arrangements to buffer risk. 
Overall these strategies are not full insurance mechanisms and, as it 
will be illustrated later, many are believed to be relatively expensive 
on the grounds of efﬁ  ciency and equity. But, in any case they can be 
seen as second-best responses to market failures that offer households 
some aid that they could not have otherwise attained. The performance 
of each informal institution depends largely on the type of uncertainty 46
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they are dealing with. For instance, local pooling systems are more 
suitable for settings in which adverse shocks are mainly idiosyncratic 
while inter-village networks work better in the face of aggregated 
events.
In terms of policy-making, it is useful to distinguish between interven-
tions that remove market failures and interventions that reinforce these 
informal mechanisms. Examples of the ﬁ  rst type would be initiatives 
to provide credit that increase the access to risk-coping technologies 
like irrigation, plow and food storage infrastructure. Public investments 
in information systems and administrative staff to strengthen local 
ﬁ  nancial structures (e.g. micro credit, cooperatives) already in place 
would be illustrative of the second sort of actions. Most important 
in evaluating the effectiveness of informal risk-coping arrangements 
is knowledge regarding their ability to provide good alternatives to 
reach an optimal allocation of risk bearing. In what follows I survey 
very general theoretical concepts and empirics associated with these 
informal responses to examine how effective they are and summarize 
some relevant aspects of their functioning.
A.   Savings and assets as risk-reducing choices
In theory, savings are an optimal ex-post response to insure con-
sumption over time. In a benchmark model of savings with perfect 
markets, farmers can borrow and lend freely, spending down savings 
when income is less than consumption and building them back up when 
consumption is less than income. As a result, the current consumption 
of households would be equal to the annuity value of total assets plus 
the discounted value of future income. Thus, purely transitory income 
changes should have little impact on consumption patterns. Households 
have mainly three forms to save and dissave: borrowing and lending 
from formal credits institutions and informal systems, accumulating 
and de-accumulating assets and storing durable goods.
But what are the barriers that may prevent optimal savings from 
happening? Obviously, having low-income is an obstacle to save and 
accumulate assets itself. Even so, as noted below, poor households use 
several forms of credit markets to insulate consumption from income 
variability. Still, saving initiatives of poor people face a number of 58 SEGUNDO SEMESTRE DE 2006, PP . 37-83.
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risks such as economic instability, inﬂ  ation, high informality, scant 
social welfare coverage and poor land titling, just to mention a few. The 
obstacles to observe well developed institutions for insurance stem pri-
marily from extensive market failures, the familiar problems of moral 
hazard, limited contract enforceability and information asymmetries. 
Quite often these failures are exacerbated in rural villages.
A good way to assess the framework of perfect capital markets is to 
verify whether savings assists in smoothing consumption through time. 
Paxson (1992) tested this model using both cross-sectional informa-
tion on income and expenditures of Thai farm households (1975/76, 
1981 and 1986) and rainfall information. Her research design has two 
main parts. First, she used rainfall shocks in central, northern and 
northeastern Thailand as instruments to separate transitory income 
from permanent income1. She also estimated the marginal propensity 
to save out of these measures of transitory income. Her results indi-
cate that a large fraction of all extra income due to temporary shocks 
is saved rather than spent. These ﬁ  ndings clearly support the savings 
responses implied by the standard model, but still concerns remain 
about their external validity. It may be possible that credit constrained 
households behave differently in the face of longer and harder shocks 
(i.e. droughts, natural disasters); alternatively, small credit institutions 
could fall apart when exposed to huge economic declines.
Farming earnings can be low and highly ﬂ  uctuant and instruments to 
accumulate valuable stocks might not be abundant in small rural vi-
llages. Consequently, the savings of many poor households appear to 
be largely a preemptive response to shocks rather than for long-term 
investment. In principle, people would think there is nothing wrong 
with a household that accumulates a bit more savings than it should 
to prepare for future periods in which the household’s income may 
be low. However, from an economist’s standpoint, only permanent 
changes in income should have an effect on the level of savings. 
Thus, accumulation with preventive motives beyond these transitory 
1   A possible drawback of this strategy is that the measurement of income does not net out 
the value of family labor. That is to say that if an increase in income leads to a reduction 
in family labor supply, with more hired labor, the effect of weather shocks on true income 
and savings may be understated.48
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changes (usually termed as “precautionary savings”) does not entail an 
optimal allocation of risk. Not surprisingly, the precautionary demand 
for savings is more widespread among poor and credit constrained 
households, with a considerable cost of foregone consumption.
Some body of the literature on savings and consumption smoothing has 
studied the issue of precautionary savings, although mainly for the U.S 
and the U.K. (see for example Zeldes [1989], Kimball [1990], Gouri-
chas and Parker [2001] and Banks, Blundell and Brugiavini [2001]). 
More generally, Deaton (1991) used U.S. data to illustrate the case of 
signiﬁ  cant saving behavior in simulations with uncorrelated shocks to 
income, as a signal of precautionary savings. This suggests that in rural 
populations, where credit constrains bind, “inefﬁ  cient” saving beha-
vior is more likely to occur. The empirical evidence seems to support 
this assertion. In fact, Udry (1995) found evidence of precautionary 
savings in rural villages of northern Nigeria. Based on a nine-round 
survey of farming households, he showed that these households saved 
signiﬁ  cantly in anticipation to the occurrence of transitory shocks. His 
estimates are remarkably high, suggesting that anticipatory savings 
were of similar magnitude to those that occurred contingent upon the 
realization of an adverse event –nearly 15% of the average Nigerian 
household income due to a one standard-deviation adverse shock. Si-
milarly, Deaton (1992) found for Côte d’Ivoire that signiﬁ  cant ﬁ  nancial 
and physical savings were taking place in anticipation of declines in 
income. In short, despite the empirical difﬁ  culties in distinguishing 
precautionary savings from prudence or borrowing constraints, the 
evidence supports signiﬁ  cant inefﬁ  cient saving behavior that is not 
easy to reconcile with the permanent-income hypothesis.
I now turn attention to the accumulation of physical assets that con-
tribute to both production and consumption. If credit markets do not 
operate well, poor households may be forced to purchase and sell 
productive assets not as a proﬁ  t-maximizing decision but to buffer 
consumption. Rosenszweig and Wolpin (1993) investigated the presen-
ce and extent of inter-linkages between production and consumption 
decisions using data for Icrisat villages in India. The authors analyzed 
the stock of bullocks, a bovine male that is employed to provide “ani-
mal traction” in monsoon agriculture in rural India. They showed that 
the probability that farmers sold bullocks in a region hit by an unfa-58 SEGUNDO SEMESTRE DE 2006, PP . 37-83.
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vorable crisis is 34% larger, namely they are sold off in “bad” times. 
Their estimates also suggest that 60% of livestock sales went to buyers 
outside the village which is an indication of inter-village risk-sharing 
behavior. Furthermore, they argued that their holdings are by and 
large lower than the optimal levels. A similar question is explored by 
Fafchamps, Udry and Czukas (1998), who examined the relationship 
between income shocks and changes in livestock in the West African 
semi-arid tropics, an agricultural region bearing a substantial degree 
of uncertainty from periodic droughts. Although their results regarding 
the total net sales of cattle are somewhat mixed, they did ﬁ  nd a non-
trivial level of exchange of goats and sheep due to income ﬂ  uctuations. 
More importantly, these exchanges did not appear to smooth risk away 
extensively and compensated on average for at most 30% of income 
shortfalls associated with village-level shocks.
Overall, poor farming households seem to use their few assets to deal 
with uncertain shortfalls, although technically these portfolio alloca-
tions are not efﬁ  cient. Furthermore, other conditions can reduce the 
effectiveness of these risk management strategies when villages are 
credit constrained, particularly when times are bleak. For example, 
when negative income shocks and low levels of assets occur simul-
taneously or when economic downturns are quite long to exhaust all 
the stocks accumulated, then these risk management strategies are 
less effective.
B.   From income smoothing to consumption smoothing
The environment of imperfect insurance and uncertainty affects pro-
ductivity as well. Many theoretical and empirical claims suggest that 
a signiﬁ  cant part of what is called consumption smoothing is actually 
disguised as income smoothing2. In the presence of borrowing constra-
ints, the separability between production and consumption no longer 
holds. Farm assets are devoted in two dimensions: proﬁ  tability and 
contribution to reduce risk. That is, farmers ﬁ  nd that crops, plots, labor 
and even migration diversiﬁ  cation can contribute to both generating 
income and mitigating risk.
2   Morduch (1990, 1995) provides a good review of the main theoretical and applied issued 
related to the importance of income smoothing over consumption smoothing. 50
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In the absence of solid ex-post consumption-smoothing mechanisms, 
rural households can limit income variability by planting the same 
crops in plots that are exposed to different weather shocks, growing 
crops with yields and prices that are uncorrelated, adopting different 
production processes, offering part of their labor to non-farm sectors 
and joining labor markets in other regions that are not subject to simi-
lar trends. This allocation of factors of production is costly though, as 
farmer’s portfolios are chosen such that they entail a tradeoff between 
somewhat lower levels of expected returns and a reduction in the risk 
associated with ﬂ  uctuations in income.
Income-earning decisions to limit consumption risk are not only in-
ﬂ  uenced by the lack of proper insurance and credit markets but also 
by risk aversion and access to technology. In other words, if only 
preferences for risk are different, more risk averse households should 
opt for higher diversiﬁ  cation and have lower average returns. All else 
equal, the same causal chain would apply if access to formal insuran-
ce systems varies among households. Although income smoothing is 
more likely to take place when credit and insurance constraints bind, 
the distinction between these three channels is crucial in strengthening 
empirical claims exploring the existence of this sort of actions.
The evidence on the subject of income smoothing is numerous, albeit 
most of the ﬁ  ndings have been drawn either from the same datasets 
(i.e. Icrisat) or similar countries. Most of the research suggests that 
in order to limit risk, more credit constrained households are likely 
to switch their methods of production and employment choices to 
more conservatives ones. For instance, Eswaran and Kotwal (1989, 
1990) showed how rural households in India with less access to con-
sumption credit had a slower adoption of new technologies in the 
Green Revolution period and engaged in less proﬁ  table investments. 
Correspondingly, Morduch’s study (1990) on Icrisat villages in South 
India revealed that poorest households diversiﬁ  ed relatively more of 
their portfolios of crops and plots, and devoted a higher proportion 
of them to safer but less lucrative varieties of rice. Binswanger and 
Rosenzweig (1993) also examined the role of risk in the distribution 
of farming resources using panel data, again, from Icrisat surveys. 
The results support the hypothesis that rural household’s portfolios 
are inﬂ  uenced by risk aversion, which is mainly due to the lack of 58 SEGUNDO SEMESTRE DE 2006, PP . 37-83.
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ex-post instruments to shield consumption. According to their esti-
mates, a one-standard deviation decline in weather risk (i.e. timing of 
the rainy season) appeared to increase average proﬁ  ts by up to 35% 
among those farmers in the lowest wealth quartile. On the contrary, 
wealthiest farmers followed proﬁ  t maximization rules more closely. 
In the same way, Dercon (1996) used data from Tanzania to show that 
poorer farmers were relatively more likely to grow sweet potatoes –a 
low-risk, low-return crop– compared to wealthier households. 
Alternatively, rural households can mitigate shocks by favoring risk-
reducing inputs and production methods. More than a few ﬁ  ndings 
in the literature back this view. Morduch (1995) analyzed the input 
choices of rice farmers in south India. He found that those in the bo-
ttom of the distribution were likely to use labor more intensively than 
what was indicated by a proﬁ  t maximizing behavior. Bliss and Stern 
(1982, cited by Morduch, 1995) argued that farmers in northern India 
could appreciably increase their proﬁ  ts by increasing the number of 
fertilizer applications. However, they spent less in fertilizer just to 
avoid investments on “useless” inputs in bad times. Along the same 
lines, Binswanger et al. (1993) showed that farmers in Icrisat villages 
allocated their assets such that the marginal product was very dissimilar 
across shares. Hence, they had been able to increase their wealth by 
substituting part of their assets in irrigated lands for shares in draft 
animals or traditional implements. Another dimension of this kind of 
response may lead to the reluctancy to adopt new technologies. Foster 
and Rosenzweig (1996) offered evidence to exemplify this strategy. 
The authors used two national data sets that describe farm households 
to estimate the determinants that affected the adoption of high yield 
varieties of seeds –an important component of what is known as the 
Green Revolution that started in the mid 1960’s. They found that cha-
racteristics that may be associated with less credit binding constraints 
(e.g. more schooling and larger owned landholdings) were positively 
associated with the probability that farm household ever adopted the 
new seeds. In previous works, Rosenzweig (1990) and Besley and 
Case (1994) have found similar evidence.
Finally, I focus the attention on the role of off-farm labor markets, 
which also provide rural households with income diversiﬁ  cation. By 
having a fraction of their labor supply employed in other agricultural 52
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activities or sectors, households can be protected from the volatility 
that farming earnings entail. Rosenzweig and Stark (1989) looked into 
this idea in Icrisat rural villages and found that households that were 
more vulnerable to transitory risk were more likely to have a member 
employed in stable but lower wage activities. Drawing from the same 
sample, Kochar (1995) showed that 87.5% of small farmers reported 
earning wages from other labor markets not associated with their 
own farming activities, in contrast only 46.4% of the large farmers 
appeared to do so. In a subsequent work, Kochar (1999) found that 
these households increased the intensive margin of their labor supply 
in response to adverse crop income shocks. Hence, male wage income 
seemed to compensate for over 30% of the change in income for small 
and medium farms while they offset only 7% of the shock for the lar-
ge ones. Likewise, Townsend (1995) and Jalan and Ravallion (1998) 
have veriﬁ  ed similar patterns for rural farming in northern Thailand 
and China, respectively.
At least a few general ideas come out from reviewing the evidence of 
consumption smoothing through income smoothing. On the one hand, 
rural households facing binding constraints do undertake risk-redu-
cing production methods. They diversify plots, crops, delay the onset 
of production, reject new economic opportunities and work in other 
markets. As noted above, the costs of these lower mean, lower variance 
alternatives are noteworthy. In addition to the forgone consumption 
and other inefﬁ  ciencies, issues such as poverty and inequality can be 
intensiﬁ  ed over time as the poorest households are more likely to rely 
heavily on these mechanisms.
C.   Local risk-pooling arrangements
Rural families can also curb their exposure to risk through communi-
ty-based insurance arrangements. Villages act as “small” economies 
where their unitary actors (i.e. households) are likely to share more in-
formation among them and have scope to pool their total consumption 
efﬁ  ciently. Households can build helpful informal insurance networks 
of mutual assistance around family and community relationships. In 
other words, related households are both more likely to be better in-
formed about each other’s resources and insure one another. In a full 
risk-pooling setting, a household that receives a negative idiosyncratic 58 SEGUNDO SEMESTRE DE 2006, PP . 37-83.
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event is expected to receive nothing less than its pre-shock fraction 
of total village income.
A ﬁ  rst implication of this risk-sharing mechanism is that in principle 
it only protects its members against individual rather than aggregate 
community-level shocks to income. A stronger covariance of risk in 
the same agricultural activities means that these systems ought to work 
better in spatially separated arrangements. In principle, there are nu-
merous reasons to think that risk is highly covariant within the same 
rural areas. First, farmers in the same village might specialize in the 
cultivation of the same crops because of soil characteristics, weather 
conditions and stronger demand for these products in close markets. 
Second, households face similar inputs, outputs and consumer goods 
prices. Third, weather-related shocks and natural disasters usually hit 
the whole population of the village. And fourth, aggregate production 
risk can lead to common general equilibrium effects in terms of em-
ployment, wages and prices.
Despite those concerns, most of the empirical literature available 
suggests that a large part of income risk in rural settings is household 
speciﬁ  c. Deaton (1992), for example, exploits two rounds of data 
from Côte d’Ivoire to assess the explanatory power of village-speci-
ﬁ  c characteristics in explaining household income ﬂ  uctuations. His 
tests suggest that common variation at the village level was slightly 
associated with speciﬁ  c income ﬂ  uctuation within the households of 
the same town. Morduch (2003) decomposed household income in 
Icrisat villages in south India to show that between 75% and 96% of 
income variation is connected to idiosyncratic shocks and climatic and 
soil heterogeneity. Alderman and Garcia (1993) looked at a three year 
longitudinal dataset in rural Pakistan and found that, to a large extent, 
village and household income do not move jointly. Similarly, using data 
for India and Thailand, Townsend (1994, 1995) found that incomes 
did not covary across households at the village level and instead they 
were earned in ways such that they were exposed to dissimilar risks.
In view of those ﬁ  ndings, not surprisingly, local risk-sharing institu-
tions appear to be very common in rural communities. Subsequently, 
the idea of testing the predictions of the full risk-sharing model against 
empirical data from rural villages has attracted the attention of many 54
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development economists. Townsend’s paper (1994) on Icrisat data, 
previously cited, is a good place to start the empirical motivation. 
Although this work was previously discussed in more depth in the 
second section of this document, it is worth-mentioning a few points of 
his results again. First, household consumption was highly dependent 
on aggregate village income and slightly correlated with idiosyncratic 
shocks. Second, full consumption smoothing in these villages was 
rejected regardless of the considerable amount of risk pooling. Ra-
vallion and Chaudhuri (1997) used the same dataset and alternative 
methods (i.e. speciﬁ  cations and instrumental variable methods) to deal 
with potential sources of bias in Townsend’s approach. The results of 
these tests on risk-sharing were very comparable to those of Town-
send and still rejected full risk-pooling. More recently, Gertler and 
Grueber (2002) used longitudinal data collected in Indonesia between 
1991 and 1993 to study health, income and expenditure changes over 
this period. The authors found that although families relied heavily 
on private informal coping strategies, consumption insurance due to 
illness events was very imperfect. Ligon, Thomas and Worral (2002) 
found that a model that includes limited commitment performs better 
at predicting consumption changes due to household speciﬁ  c shocks in 
Icrisat Indian villages. The list of other papers on this topic is certainly 
long, but overall, a fair amount of evidence from other countries and 
surveys seem to reject full risk-sharing (see for example Morduch 
[1991] for India, Udry [1990] for Nigeria, Rashid [1990] and Alderman 
and Garcia [1993] for Pakistan, Deaton [1992] and Grimard [1997] 
for Côte d’Ivoire, Jalan and Ravallion [1998] for China, Suri [2003] 
for Kenya and Dercon and Krishnan [2004] for Ethiopia).
Other research efforts have been devoted to studying speciﬁ  c com-
ponents of these methods: transfers between households. Subgroups 
that are somehow connected (e.g. families, neighbors, ethnic groups, 
clans, castes, religious afﬁ  liations, among others) can make use of 
mutual insurance arrangements, with members that experience low 
income draws receiving aid from those with high draws. Many studies 
have used detailed information on private inter-households transfers 
and intra-time income variability to test this form of consumption 
smoothing. Most have found evidence of state-contingent transfers 
or remittances between network members. For instance, Rosenzweig 
(1988) used panel data from six Icrisat villages in India over a period 58 SEGUNDO SEMESTRE DE 2006, PP . 37-83.
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of nine years to identify the determinants of household net transfers 
and explore the role of networks as risk-coping institutions. He showed 
that, in fact, reciprocal transfers within extended families were ac-
tively employed to reduce income variability, particularly between 
less wealthy families. Nevertheless, his calculations suggest that, on 
average, only two percent of the income shortfall was compensated 
by transfers among households.
Udry (1994), in his study of four northern Nigerian villages, found 
records of regular transfers between households but they were not 
large enough to attain full risk-sharing. Fafchamps and Lund (2003) 
collected longitudinal data from four villages of northern Philippines 
to look at the role of transfers between rural households. Using a very 
rich set of variables for mutual insurance groups, they found that 
gifts and transfers –often in the form of loans– were common among 
networks of relatives and friends in the event of household speciﬁ  c 
shocks. However, these loans only partially smoothed consumption. 
In the context of Latin America, Santos (2006) also found that pri-
vate transfers and informal loans increased after a natural disaster 
in Nicaragua in 1998 and that the severity of the shock suffered by 
a particular household was positively correlated with the amount of 
private transfers received. However, subsequent estimates by Baez 
and Santos (2006) indicate that these transfers did not fully protect 
their consumption. Other pieces of evidence, mainly from Africa, have 
reached similar results (e.g. Lucas and Stark [1985] for Bostwana, 
Dercon and Krishman [2000] for Ethiopia, and Udry and Duﬂ  o [2004] 
for Côte d’Ivoire). Likewise, other economists have approached the 
motives of gift-giving transfers from an altruistic perspective (e.g. 
Lucas and Stark [1985], Altonji, Hayashi and Kotlikoff [1992], Foster 
and Rosenzweig [2000]). In general, their ﬁ  ndings appear to endorse 
the notion that these exchanges, although important, are only partially 
able to cope with risk3.
3   It is important to mention that conclusions about risk-sharing drawn from data on intra-
household transfers have to be interpreted with caution. There are several reasons why this 
inference may be misleading. It may be that some types of transfers are not recorded (e.g. 
in-kind transfers, small gifts, donated labor and other inputs, time allocated to household 
chores). It is possible that unconditional remittances are instead used by migrants to pay back 
for education and health, or perhaps to raise their chances of inheriting family wealth. 56
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As mentioned at the beginning of this section, it appears that aggregate 
risks are left uninsured under local risk-pooling. Even in the presence 
of this sort of shocks, there may be substantial scope for complemen-
tary arrangements. For example, if rural towns are connected to larger 
centers with credit markets they can engage in inter-village loans. 
Alternatively, households within the networks can transfer people 
instead of money to create spatially-dispersed alternative options for 
income generation.
A logical empirical question coming out from the latter point is whether 
migration location choices somehow obey patterns to moderate aggre-
gated risks. The evidence available is supportive of this idea. A paper 
previously quoted, Rosenzweig’s (1988), showed that the transfer rate 
among rural Indian households is highly dependent on the household 
structure. That is, households with a greater number of members who 
migrated and have more daughters-in-law are not only more likely to 
exchange resources but also exhibit greater transfers. Paulson (2000), 
for instance, used both cross-sectional household information and 
rainfall data from Thailand to show that remittances had a strong 
insurance component. She also found that remitters from provinces 
with high covariant incomes with Bangkok were less likely to move 
there. Rosenzweig and Stark (1989) explored the idea of migration 
and marriage patterns in rural India. They observed that households 
in these communities used to follow systems of patrilocal exogamy 
to mitigate risk, with households exporting daughters and importing 
daughters-in-law4. The data revealed that families had a diversiﬁ  ed 
portfolio of marital partners: over 92% of married women came from 
or went to another village, and in families with two or more married 
women, 94% of them have different origins. The list of other studies 
looking at the income security motives of migration is fairly long. 
Johnson and Whitelaw (1974), Stark and Bloom (1985), Lucas and 
Stark (1985), and Barham and Boucher (1998), just to mention a few, 
gather illustrative evidence of compensatory remittances in Africa, 
Asia and more recently in Latin America.
4   More speciﬁ  cally, households ﬁ  nd incentives to spread the family spatially so the bride 
comes from a different community and goes to live with the family of the husband. There-
fore, this marriage residency pattern creates a risk-sharing partner (altruism) and develops 
monitoring capacity between families. 58 SEGUNDO SEMESTRE DE 2006, PP . 37-83.
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D.   Informal financial systems 
The poor development of formal market institutions for dealing with 
risk in low-income regions is often attributed to informational pro-
blems such as adverse selection, moral hazard, limited enforcement 
and veriﬁ  cation costs. For several reasons, these market imperfections 
are sharper in rural communities. For instance, agricultural proﬁ  ts are 
very volatile, farmers are less likely to repay loans under the standard 
terms of commercial banks, they have little physical asses to offer as 
collateral, making it difﬁ  cult to punish low repayment and, in gene-
ral, to enforce contracts. Furthermore, the size of the market in small 
villages typically does not offset the high transaction costs implicit in 
formal credit activities. Such features of rural markets are commonly 
invoked to argue in favor of policy interventions that remove these 
failures. 
Although those obstacles in fact exist, low-income countries have de-
veloped alternative informal mechanisms of credit. Rural households 
and farmers have access to a wide array of ﬁ  nancial sources such as in-
formal credit and insurance arrangements, credit cooperatives and mu-
tuals, rotating savings and credit associations and informal borrowing 
from relatives, neighbors, landlords, moneylenders and shopkeepers. 
These systems have comparative advantages that can overcome the 
informational problems faced by formal markets. In principle, they 
are not strictly tied to the contractual obligations regularly observed in 
formal banks and insurance companies. On the contrary, their greater 
capacity to exert local monitoring and impose sanctions –usually under 
well-deﬁ  ned social rules– act as substitutes for traditional collateral 
guarantees and legal enforcement. Households in the same village have 
often lived alongside each other for a long time and their members 
are well informed other’s activities and successes. In addition, these 
communities have developed to some extent codes of social sanction 
that are employed to enforce agreements. Hence, informal credit and 
insurance institutions are still able to work in environments where 
formal markets would not be very much likely to do so.
The underlying reasons of why these alternative institutions have 
emerged and the role played by them in providing informal credit and 
insurance have been examined in the literature. Theoretical tools from 58
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modern microeconomics like information economics, contract theory 
and mechanism design theory have been devoted to jointly enrich the 
understanding of the ﬁ  rst issue. In turn, the insights into the impor-
tance of these arrangements as risk-coping devices originate from 
empirical contributions on this subject, one of the most active ﬁ  elds in 
development economics. A good survey of the theories of contracting 
under informal settings is found in Conning and Udry (2005). For the 
purpose of this paper, a better focus is to review some relevant analy-
ses from the empirical side of the literature. In what follows I present 
this overview for three of the most common informal mechanisms of 
lending in the rural economy: informal group loans, microﬁ  nance and, 
rotating savings and credit associations.
1.  Informal group loans 
Informal systems of risk-sharing all have the aim of providing forms 
of credit and insurance. However, they are social mechanisms that 
vary greatly from one village to another, making it very difﬁ  cult 
to generalize how they begin, grow and develop. Yet, some studies 
provide useful illustrations for speciﬁ  c locations. Udry (1990), for 
instance, examined informal credit among relatives, friends and other 
networks in four rural villages of northern Nigeria. His article portrays 
a great description of how these loans occur and presents evidence 
that information asymmetries between borrowers and lenders were 
negligible. Collateral and contractual interlinkages were not used to 
secure these loans and they rarely constrained borrowing from hap-
pening. In an extension of his research on credit markets in Africa, 
Udry (1994) tested models of state-contingent loans against survey 
data from the same villages in Nigeria. His ﬁ  ndings indicate that the 
terms of these informal loans (i.e. repayments contingent upon the 
realization of random income shocks) are such that risk is –at least in 
principle– pooled efﬁ  ciently within the village. Rosenzweig (1988) 
found that informal borrowing accounted for about 11% of shortfalls 
in income as compared to the 2% of intra-household transfers in rural 
Indian villages. Fafchamps and Lund (2003) examined data from rural 
areas of the northern Philippines and found that only 20% of the loans 
in these regions were received from formal sources. Instead, most of 
the loans were transacted between relatives and friends in the same 
village, were used for consumption smoothing reasons, did not require 
collateral and were seldom interlinked with other arrangements. 58 SEGUNDO SEMESTRE DE 2006, PP . 37-83.
DESARROLLO Y SOCIEDAD
59
Similar evidence stressing the prominent reliance on informal loans, 
including moneylenders and pawnbrokers, has been found for other 
countries as well (e.g. Besley [1995] and Kan [2000] for Taiwan, 
Jalan and Ravallion [1998] for China, Mohieldin and Wright [2000] 
for Egypt). Overall, the relevance of these results is twofold. On one 
hand, these second best transactions appear to be real and signiﬁ  cant 
means to mitigate risk. On the other hand, the evidence of repayments 
responding to the circumstances of the lending household suggest that 
these loans allow a distribution of risk within the villages that comes 
closer to a fully Pareto efﬁ  cient allocation.  
2. Microﬁ  nance
I now switch the analysis to brieﬂ  y describe the role played by group 
lending. One of its forms, microﬁ  nance institutions, have rapidly 
evolved and expanded as a borrowing option for low-income people 
in developing countries during the last two decades or so. The system 
is based on the informational advantages of agrarian communities to 
lessen the standard asymmetries that harm formal markets of credit. 
Rural villages are typically small, highly integrated and their members 
are mostly immobile. Hence, this people have a great deal of informa-
tion about each other –often not available to outsiders– and thus, the 
capacity to impose social sanctions on those who do not comply with 
their ﬁ  nancial obligations. Micro-credit organizations exploit these 
features to offer group-lending contracts under joint liability. That is, 
borrowers are required to form small groups (usually between 5 and 10 
people) in which all members are jointly responsible for each other’s 
loans and are committed to periodic repayment schedules. As a result, 
“good” risk individuals are expected to self-select into the same groups 
and exert peer pressure on the other members to repay or risk losing 
the funds. Traditionally these loans are given to women on the basis 
that they more often beneﬁ  t the whole family compared to when loans 
are given to men and can strengthen their socioeconomic status. 
According to estimates of the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor 
(2006), an agency backed by the World Bank and other institutions 
to track the performance of micro-credit organizations in developing 
countries, around 500 million low-income individuals have access to 
these ﬁ  nancial services worldwide. About 84% percent of them are in 60
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Asia and more than half of these beneﬁ  ciaries are in China and India. 
One example of these mutual credit organizations is the Grameen 
Bank of Bangladesh, widely known as one of the leaders in the world 
of microﬁ  nance and a Nobel Peace Prize winner. In the year 2000, it 
offered subsidized loans to more than two million borrowers in 36,000 
villages and had repayment rates of approximately 98%5. 
Technically, microﬁ  nance institutions are desirable in the interests of 
efﬁ  ciency because they help to bring market outcomes closer to second 
best allocations. Furthermore, by providing subsidized interest rates, 
they also appear to be beneﬁ  cial in the grounds of equity and poverty 
reduction. On the other hand, concerns remain over their costs, small 
scale and, mainly, high dependence on donations and lack of self-sus-
tainability. Some studies, mostly policy reports, have examined these 
issues. Khandker (1998), just to mention one of them, conducted a 
cost-beneﬁ  t analysis of Grameen Bank in Bangladesh. He estimated 
social costs of 0.91 cents per each dollar of beneﬁ  ts to clients, almost 
twice the beneﬁ  ts of other poverty alleviation programs like food-for-
work and cash-conditioned transfers programs. However, Morduch’s 
survey (1999) has a very detailed account of this and other cost-beneﬁ  t 
evaluations of several micro-credit organizations that counterbalance 
the belief of their huge social beneﬁ  t. 
Simply looking at cost-beneﬁ  t ratios does not provide enough insights 
into the opportunities available to households in the absence of micro-
credit. Unfortunately, there are few papers that have adopted reliable 
research designs to assess the social impact of these opportunities. 
The direction of these ﬁ  ndings is also, unfortunately, inconclusive. For 
example, Pitt and Khandker (1998) looked at the impact of participation 
in three micro credit programs in Bangladesh on a set of household- and 
individual-level outcomes. They found that credit provided to women 
increased household consumption, assets, labor supply and children 
schooling. Amin, Rai and Topa (2002) used panel data to evaluate the 
impact of the Grameen bank in two Bangladeshi villages. In contrast, 
they found that although mostly poor households joined micro-credit 
5   Morduch (1999) recalculated these repayment rates incorporating standard accounting 
and found that they are about 85% to 90%, which are still impressively high despite not 
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programs, the less vulnerable among them (i.e. more access to insu-
rance and smoothing devices) were more likely to receive loans from 
these programs. Other study by Coleman (1999) exploits quasi-experi-
mental variation from phasing in of joint-liability banks in villages of 
northern Thailand in 1995-1996. The author concluded that program 
loans were having little impact on promoting an increase in physical 
assets, savings, production, sales, labor time and expenditures on health 
care and education. Likewise, Morduch (1999) reviewed administrative 
data from The Grameen Bank together with information from eligible 
villages with no access to micro-credit. He found equivalent school 
enrollment rates for children in treatment and control towns, as well 
as similar outcomes on other social dimensions.
The literature on microcredit is now full of case studies that illustrate 
speciﬁ  c experiences. Likewise, other more general and fundamental 
aspects of microﬁ  nance institutions have been deeply investigated. 
Although they will not be discussed here in detail, it may be useful 
to mention a few of them. For example, Morduch (1999b) highlights 
that some characteristics of their functioning (e.g. heavy reliance on 
external funding from donors, modest proﬁ  ts, high expenses per unit 
transacted, declining repayment rates, high transaction costs) represent 
potential threats to their future stability. Hossain (1988) and Morduch 
(1999b) have also examined the limitations of group lending to bear 
risk. Another concern lies in knowing whether group-lending contracts 
effectively mitigate informational asymmetries between lenders and 
borrowers, as theoretically studied by Stiglitz (1990), Varian (1990), 
and empirically by Udry (1994), Banerjee, Besley and Guinnane (1994) 
and Udry (1995). Others like Besley and Coate (1995) and Paxton, 
Graham and Thraen (2000) have argued both formally and empirically 
that joint-liability does not assure an improvement in payment rates.
The array of questions around these institutions is too broad to be 
covered in depth here. However, after bringing together some of the 
results available in the literature, there is a sense that microﬁ  nance 
programs are highly cost-sensitive, in some cases may produce only 
limited beneﬁ  ts and, even within a program, wealthier families could 
beneﬁ  t more. Instead, these conclusions warrant careful thinking about 
the design of these institutions. 62
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3.  Rotating savings and credit associations
Rotating savings and credit associations (Roscas) constitute another 
common type of mutual organization in the rural world, particularly in 
Africa and other developing countries in Asia6. These associations are 
often founded by individuals that belong to similar ethnic backgrounds, 
native language and sometimes place of origin or location proximity. 
Members of these organizations come together and commit to putting 
a ﬁ  xed amount of money into a “pot” during a speciﬁ  c length of time. 
Contributions vary based on the number of participating members, the 
duration of the agreement, the winning amount and some socioeco-
nomic characteristics of their members. These contributions can be 
made daily, weekly, monthly and even half-yearly with usually small 
agreements having small cycle periods. Each period, an explicit amount 
of money is drawn from this fund –generally either by a random or 
bidding allocation– and given as a lump sum to one member. Under 
some circumstances, the pot is given to a member who is in most need 
for funding. This process is repeated without including past winners in 
subsequent lotteries –although they keep making their contributions– and 
it ends when each member of the group has received the pot once. 
These informal collective arrangements have pros and cons. On one 
hand, Roscas provide opportunities for joint savings while keeping 
the resources fairly liquid, a salient beneﬁ  t in environments with scant 
appealing savings instruments. They are also quite ﬂ  exible and easily 
adaptable to the particular conditions and patterns of grouping in each 
village. In addition, and similar to micro-credit institutions, Roscas 
circumvent informational asymmetries by exploiting social connec-
tedness at the village level. The involvement of the community in 
organizational and operational aspects produces favorable self-selected 
groups. Therefore, the groups are formed among individuals whose 
characteristics and general circumstances are well known to each other. 
The risk of default is handled by all members, with defaulters being 
prevented from any further participation in future agreements. 
6   Although mostly common in low-income economies, they are also found in developed 
countries, such as the U.S., and are primarily used by immigrant groups.58 SEGUNDO SEMESTRE DE 2006, PP . 37-83.
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On the other hand, a concern lies in the cyclical timing of the sys-
tem. The probability of obtaining the pot does not necessarily match 
someone’s ﬁ  nancial needs, which is particularly true in random Ros-
cas. And a similar logic applies to the case of savings. Besides, since 
the funds can be received no more than once, bidding Roscas may 
partially solve this problem only if their members deal with shocks 
that do not persist. Location can be another downside of the system. 
Members of the cooperative usually live close to each other and are 
exposed to covariant risks. Thus, several individuals could have high 
necessities at the same time. Regarding the commitment with the fund, 
default may take place –even in the presence of social punishment 
to enforce pledge– because contributors themselves face stochastic 
income streams. 
There is a fair amount of literature on the origins and operation of 
these organizations. Most of these contributions actually come from 
social sciences like anthropology and sociology7. The book by Ardener 
and Burman (1995) compiles numerous case studies and references 
of previous studies on Roscas from the perspective of these discipli-
nes. As for the economics research, this has been largely committed 
to both formalize the economic role of these ﬁ  nancial systems and 
assess their impact. 
As for the ﬁ  rst part of this literature, the theoretical work by Besley, 
Coate and Loury (1993) develops a model of savings for an indivisi-
ble durable good that offers a very sophisticated analysis of Roscas. 
Their ﬁ  ndings can be summarized in three main points. First, they 
showed that each type of Rosca allows individuals to achieve a more 
efﬁ  cient allocation than the one obtained in the case of autarky (i.e. 
without access to credit markets)8. Second, they demonstrated a higher 
performance of random over bidding Roscas under the assumption of 
homogenous preferences among members of the groups. On the con-
trary, bidding Roscas with heterogeneous individuals (e.g. different 
7   For instance, see the studies by Clifford Geertz (1962), Shirley Ardener (1964) and Fritz 
Bouman (1977, 1979).
8   They support this view in terms of the reduction in individuals’ utility of savings due to 
high ﬁ  nancial intermediation costs, normally found in environments with high market 
imperfections. 64
Income Volatility, Risk-Coping Behavior and Consumption Smoothing 
Mechanisms in Developing Countries: A Survey
Javier E. Baez
tastes for the durable good, receipt of the pot) are superior. And third, 
they showed how the risk of default is greater for bidding Roscas. In 
a subsequent study (Besley et al., [1994]), the same authors expand 
their analysis about the allocative performance of these associations. 
Overall, their ﬁ  ndings suggest that the allocations of either type of 
Rosca are inferior vis-à-vis those of formal credit devices. Therefore, 
individuals would be better off with access to credit and insurance 
markets. Calomiris and Rajamaran (1998) questioned the emphasis 
given in previous works to the role of consumption of lumpy durables 
as the sole reason for Roscas to exist. In contrast, they argued –both 
formally and descriptively– in favor of the insurance motives of types 
of Roscas that are widely reported in developing countries. There are 
other studies in the literature examining the basic structure of these 
systems (e.g. Kovsted and Lyk-Jensen (1999), Ambec and Nicolas 
Treich (2007)). On the whole, they seem to agree on their importance 
as an alternative credit institution; however they do call attention to 
the superiority of more formal risk-coping mechanisms.
Not surprisingly, given the great diversity of Roscas around the world, 
almost all the empirics on this subject are studies on a particular type 
of association. Although it may not be fair to draw conclusions from 
such speciﬁ  c analyses, a review of a number of of them still provi-
des insights into their operation and impact on some socioeconomic 
outcomes. A ﬁ  rst topic of interest is the common observation in the 
literature about the high participation of women in organizing and 
overseeing Roscas. Anderson and Baland (2002) explored this issue 
by looking at data from 520 households in Kibera, the largest slum 
in Kenya. Nearly 84% of Roscas’ participants in their sample were 
women, most of them married and with a regular income-earning 
occupation. The authors used an intra-household bargaining approach 
to explain this observation and found that women joined Roscas as a 
way to protect their savings and prevent men from overspending on 
current consumption.
Levenson and Besley (1997) used a nationally representative survey 
of households in Taiwan and also examined participation in Roscas 
discriminated by income groups. Their tests indicate that membership 
increased with income and was relatively more widespread among 
people with stable occupations. In view of these ﬁ  ndings, these asso-58 SEGUNDO SEMESTRE DE 2006, PP . 37-83.
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ciations could be important receptors of savings from the wealthier 
households in areas with low access to formal sources of credit or 
where intermediation costs are high. In an earlier work on Taiwan 
again, Levenson and Besley (1996) found evidence to support the 
idea that participation in Roscas helped in explaining an increase in 
durables accumulation by households between 1977 and 1991. Finally, 
Handa and Kirton (1999) tested some of the theoretical foundations of 
Roscas discussed above against data from a rural region in Jamaica. 
Their results support several aspects of these associations such as 
their sustainability under different contracts and the homogeneity of 
their members. But more importantly, these results indicate that their 
members used these funds for the purchase of durable goods as well 
as precautionary savings for unexpected expenses.
In summary, a general overview of the literature on Roscas gives the 
idea that they are not perfect substitutes of formal markets for credit. 
However, as was noted in the case of micro-credit institutions, they 
are second best responses and dominant sources of ﬁ  nance to the rural 
economy. The debate is far from being conclusive. Some successes 
seem to be weighted by some failures. But apart from that, the big 
picture taken out of the evidence discussed here hints at the key role 
of both microﬁ  nance and Roscas to provide poor –and often credit 
constrained– households with some level of income security. 
E.   Agricultural contracting
The high-risk environment of most agricultural activities and, particu-
larly the lack of formal markets for credit and insurance to deal with it, 
play a prominent role in shaping the types of contracts in the agrarian 
sector. Two main market failures characterize these contracting rela-
tionships. First is the classic moral hazard problem; here labor is not 
fully monitorable at reasonable costs and, thus, effort is not observa-
ble. Second, there are incomplete markets for insurance and credit in 
settings with risk-averse agents. Farmers face considerable risk even 
in commodities with well developed markets for future prices. 
The ﬁ  rst of these problems can be modeled as a speciﬁ  c case of the 
standard agency theory, with the decision-making power delegated 
from the landowner (“principal”) to the farmer (“agent”) under con-66
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ditions of asymmetric information. Under these conditions, contracts 
are designed to introduce the incentives that determine second best 
input choices and output levels. The mechanism design theory in the 
context of models of agricultural contracting –pioneered by Stiglitz 
(1974), Bell and Zusman (1976), Newbery (1997), Stiglitz and Bra-
verman (1982) and widely expanded later by other authors– offers 
a decision environment with sophisticated tools to formalize these 
systems of incentives. Their predictions are quite illustrative and can 
be shortly summarized. On the one hand, with imperfect information, 
tenants can work on the land and earn a ﬁ  xed wage. However, no in-
centives to exert an optimal labor allocation are provided under this 
scheme, unless the landlord can supervise workers’ effort and choices 
at reasonable costs. On the other hand, if risk-aversion is added to the 
model, the second-best optimal choice of arrangement that provides 
stronger incentives is a pure rent contract.
Yet, the second market imperfection is more related to the focus of the 
discussion in this review. This failure implies that in the absence of 
formal risk-coping devices, contracts between landlords and tenants 
can be written so as to split the proportions of risks born by each of 
them. That is, payment schemes can be agreed such that they affect 
the incidence of risk on these two agents. In fact, as noted below, the-
re are certain interlinkages in the contracts of the agricultural world 
that involve informal –and often inefﬁ  cient– risk-sharing and credit 
instruments. I center the attention below in the two most common: 
sharecropping and interlinking.
Sharecropping is a system of farm tenancy in which the landlord allows 
the sharecropper to cultivate the land in return for a share of the crop 
obtained from this land9. In terms of efﬁ  ciency, sharecropping lies in 
the middle of ﬁ  xed wage and ﬁ  xed rent contracts. The tenant bears 
the full cost of effort, receives just a fraction of the marginal product 
and, thus, supplies a suboptimal level of effort. Both sharecropping 
9  Kotwal and Eswaran (1984) offer another interesting extension of sharecropping that incor-
porates the exchange of non-marketed inputs: supervision time and management time. The 
analysis assumes that landlords have comparative advantages in management (i.e. skills in 
allocating inputs) and tenants have comparative advantage in supervision. Thus, the landlord 
supplies some level of management and the tenant supplies some of supervision, but less 
than the full optimal amount.58 SEGUNDO SEMESTRE DE 2006, PP . 37-83.
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and pure rent provide incentives with no need of monitoring, but the 
latter is more efﬁ  cient both in terms of productivity and risk allocation. 
In turn, interlinking is a form of agricultural contract that entails the 
landlord as the supplier of land, inputs, credit and even consumption 
goods to tenant farmers. As an extension of sharecropping, interlin-
king also provides a method by which part of the uncertainty is born 
by the landlord and the provision of goods, services and credit can 
maintain incentives for the tenant. Still, sharecropping and interlinking 
contracts may not be fully efﬁ  cient compared to the ﬁ  rst best scenario 
of complete markets for credit and insurance. 
Testing empirically that the presence of interlinkages in tenancy con-
tracts may not be fully efﬁ  cient compared to the ﬁ  rst best scenario (i.e. 
perfect information and complete markets for credit and insurance) is 
certainly a hard task. There are several sorts of population and land 
heterogeneity and few detailed data sets to deal with them. Still, the 
quantiﬁ  cation of landlord- and tenant-level behavioral responses to 
sharecropping and interlinking contractual terms have received some 
attention in the literature. Shaban’s paper (1987) is a classic work on the 
subject. He used data from Icrisat villages in India to examine whether 
inputs utilization and outputs differed systematically on lands under 
different tenure status, namely between sharecropped land and owned 
or rented plots. He found that output per acre and the number of hours 
worked under sharecropping contracts were relatively lower. Along 
the same lines, Foster and Rosenzweig (1994) test the performance 
of sharecropping against longitudinal data from a rural province in 
Philippines. Exploiting the change of body mass as a proxy of effort, 
they also found that share tenants were less productive. Dubois (2002) 
arrived to similar conclusions in this sample when comparing land 
quality.
If the inability to perfect monitor labor and specify effort in contracts 
do not justify the existence of sharecropping and interlinking, why 
do they exist? What is it that makes sharecropping a very popular 
payment agreement in agrarian structures of low-income countries? 
Much of its popularity arises from risk and the lack of effective sys-
tems to mitigate it. Interlinkages in agricultural contracts result from 
the informal exchange between incentives and risk-sharing. Tenants 
are poorer and, thus, expected to be more risk averse. Accordingly, 68
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they tend to accept contracts with lower earnings instead of alternative 
payment schemes with higher but more uncertain earnings. The less 
able to protect consumption, the more likely they are to engage in these 
type of contracts. This does not mean that the degree of risk aversion is 
what determines this behavior, rather it is their fragile income security. 
Laffont and Matoussi (1995) provide evidence to back this idea. They 
looked at the role of credit constraints in sharecropping in a rural area 
of Tunis. Their results conﬁ  rm the importance of risks in shaping these 
arrangements: the probability that a tenant accepts a share contract is 
negatively associated with their working capital. Similar results have 
been found for Turkey (Tunali [1993]). 
It has been stressed throughout this review that rural economies suffer 
from greater market asymmetries that prevent the development of cre-
dit and insurance markets. In a setting with these limitations, tenancy 
contracts offer a tradeoff between incentives and insurance that might 
not be reached otherwise. Like the other informal systems discussed so 
far, they are second best alternatives and should not be underestimated. 
However, there is always the concern that these contracts –and the 
risk-sharing they entail– may be very costly for the poorest. 
IV.   Shocks, consumption insecurity and long term      
 impacts
I will ﬁ  nish this overview with a brief discussion of the long term wel-
fare consequences of income and assets shocks that remain uninsured. 
Hopefully, the concepts and material reviewed so far has illustrated 
that the capacity of poor rural households to maintain an optimal 
stream of consumption over various states of nature and along time is 
often imperfect. Thus, the question becomes, how do they adjust their 
expenditures? Since nutrition, schooling and health-care utilization 
represent large cash expenditures shares of their budgets, are these 
basic consumption components reduced when income is lower than 
expected? Do farmers rely on the labor of their children? Do these 
adjustments have long term impacts?
As previously illustrated in this document, there has been a broad and 
permanent concern about the limited ability of farmers to insure against 58 SEGUNDO SEMESTRE DE 2006, PP . 37-83.
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negative income ﬂ  uctuations. Surprisingly, the literature has committed 
less attention to the long lasting effects of income volatility in deve-
loping countries. Still, some studies have tackled this issue and shed 
some light on the possible answers. For example, Jacoby and Skouﬁ  as 
(1997) examined the consequences of income shocks on human capital 
accumulation. They used data from six Icrisat rural villages in India 
to study the effects of income ﬂ  uctuations on the time allocation of 
children ages 5 to 18. According to their results, children were less 
likely to enroll in school in periods with unanticipated aggregated and 
idiosyncratic shocks. Moreover, they found that poorest household 
had drawn more intensively upon the labor of their children to self-
insure against these events. Foster (1995) explored rural households’ 
vulnerability in other dimensions of well-being such as health and 
nutrition. In order to do that, Foster compared children growth in rural 
areas affected by very destructive ﬂ  oods in Bangladesh and observed 
that both landowning and landless households took out loans after 
the disaster. However, Foster found that better-off households (i.e. 
landowners) had more access to cheaper loans and, therefore, were 
more successful in offsetting the negative impact of the ﬂ  oods on 
child weight. In contrast, the nutritional status of children in landless 
families was more vulnerable to the conditions created by the ﬂ  ood. 
Similarly, Behrman (1988) had already found analogous effects of 
negative income shocks on children’s health in rural India.
 
Similar responses have been identiﬁ  ed for low-income countries in 
other regions of the world. For instance, Jensen (2000) assessed the 
impact of volatile income on children well-being using time series 
of cross-sectional data from rural communities in Côte d’Ivoire. He 
examined whether children living in regions that went through adverse 
weather shocks had lower investment in education and health. After the 
shock, school enrollment declined on average 20% for the treatment 
group compared to the control group, over one-third of the initial level. 
Similarly, the percentage of sick children taken for consultation and 
nutrition decreased considerably in regions facing negative shocks. 
Beegle, Dehejia and Gatti (2003) used panel data from Tanzania to 
show that temporary income shocks led to increased child labor, mostly 
in households with less collateralizable assets. As for Latin America, 
Baez and Santos (2006) followed a similar approach to examine 
children’s vulnerability after a natural disaster in Nicaragua. They used 70
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longitudinal data and exploited the trajectory of a hurricane in a quasi-
experimental design. Their results indicate that affected children were 
8.7 percentage points more likely to be undernourished. In addition, 
relative to controls, child labor participation more than doubled and 
health care utilization was reduced in nearly 30%. 
The few results presented here point to the importance of assessing 
the long run effects of imperfect consumption smoothing. And, more 
importantly, they draw attention to the costly strategies often adopted 
to deal with transitory shocks. Adjustments including reductions in 
schooling, nutrition and health in households that are already poor 
can be extremely harmful, particularly if they disrupt human capital 
formation and future earning ability of children. 
V.   Concluding remarks
This paper has attempted to provide a brief overview of general con-
cepts and inﬂ  uential ﬁ  ndings of empirical research on risk-coping beha-
vior and consumption smoothing arrangements in agrarian economies 
of developing countries. With that goal in mind, this report is intended 
to be a useful guide for non-specialists in the subject or for anyone 
beginning applied microeconomic research work on income volatility, 
insurance and credit market incompleteness in rural settings. This has 
become an important topic for the research agenda in development 
economics over the last two decades and numerous issues have been 
investigated. I have placed a particular interest in presenting the uneven 
vulnerability of poor people to risk, some of the informal mechanisms 
to deal with it and the extent of their performance. In doing so, I have 
been able to arrive at some general conclusions.
As the above review makes clear, more than a few formal models 
and empirical papers are indicative of the limited ability of poor rural 
households –which are the majority among the rural population– to 
“ﬁ  rst-best” optimally transfer resources across time and income 
cycles. However, this review has also contrasted the ﬁ  rst best outcome 
against the existence of alternative informal instruments to bear risk. 
The vast variety of these alternatives in the rural world makes broad 
generalizations difﬁ  cult to make. In spite of that, taking all coping 
strategies together, consumption does not fully track income but still 58 SEGUNDO SEMESTRE DE 2006, PP . 37-83.
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does partially; income insecurity is more prevalent among the poorest. 
Furthermore, some of these informal mechanisms for dealing with risk 
are the result of nonseparabilities between consumption and produc-
tion choices which in turn, appear to be extremely costly in terms of 
forgone consumption and production capacity.
Still, there are unanswered questions on the whole subject that surely 
will capture the attention of future research. For instance, what are the 
total costs of informal risk reduction through income smoothing and 
other means at the household level? Do they lead to a poverty trap? 
Since the poor appear to be less able to bear risk, how much does 
uninsured income risk explain income inequality? Which informal 
mechanisms work best? Is there conclusive evidence that improving 
access to credit and insurance markets raise efﬁ  ciency? If so, what is 
the best way for governments and other institutions to provide missing 
markets or correct existing failures? Could publicly provided access to 
ﬁ  nancial and insurance services crowd out current informal instruments 
with little gain to society? Although existing results have something 
to say about these issues, clearly more case-speciﬁ  c research work is 
needed before they can be accepted as general conclusions. 
The ﬁ  ndings discussed here have policy implications as well. Public 
interventions can play a signiﬁ  cant role in strengthening the most 
effective informal systems already in place and improving the provi-
sion of more formal ﬁ  nancial and insurance services. To do so, policy 
makers and analysts need to make a distinction between a “superﬁ  cial 
accounting” and a more “sophisticated” and accurate diagnosis of the 
barriers to achieve fully functioning markets. The ﬁ  rst approach would 
simply say that children’s school attendance is lower in agricultural 
households and thus, public programs to build more schools and edu-
cational facilities in these villages should be supported. The second 
approach would explore the economic constraints of these households 
and the reasons of why children are kept away from schools even if 
these are available. The ﬁ  rst type of analysis would say that poor far-
mers are poor and cannot deal with risk because they do not use the 
best technology available and do not have enough land, inputs and 
physical and human capital. The second one would explore the rea-
sons of the economic environment (e.g. credit constraints) that do not 
allow households and farmers to reach their full productive potential. 72
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Markets can be incomplete, imperfect, distorted or non-existent. The 
environment may be characterized by inherent limitations and under-
developed institutions. A better understanding of the causes and not 
the symptoms of informal risk-coping behavior and its social welfare 
implications can surely lead to more efﬁ  cient policy design. 
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